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CHAPTER 4 
Law and Literature and History 
Christine L. Krueger 
Thinking historically about law and literature has become a common, 
if not obligatory, scholarly pracrice. Yet historicism was largely absent 
from the founding of the inrerdiscipline. For the influential "law and 
lireramre movement" in particular, New Critical and neo-Aristotelian 
paradigms seemed better suited to promoting literature as a humanizing 
corrective to legal reasoning that they believed to be rule-bound, unem· 
pathetic, and unjust. If putting law and lirerature into conversation 
required some deft disciplinary negotiations, that was nothing compared 
to the demands of synthesizing both with history. This chapter tells a 
story of how this came about: what developments urged historicism on 
law and literature, what practical, merhodologica.l and ideological challenges 
were overcome, what benefits have accrued from this new multidisciplinary 
practice, and what problems it present.~. In effect, this chapter historidzes 
how an interdisciplinary practice became a multidisciplinary one. 
I begin with the methodological and ideological challenges that compli­
cated the development of law, literature, and history as a multidisciplinary 
practice, and the imperatives that compelled their synthesis. Two forces 
that influenced both law and literature likewise uansformed the discipline 
of history: New Historicism and the theorization of historical traumas, 
principally in Holocaust studies. New Historicism may be the more obvious 
influence, though not an uncomplicated one. The impact that Holocaust 
studies has had on transitional justice movements constitutes an equally 
potent - and even competing- influence on what history means for law and 
literature. Therefore, no account of the multidiscipline can ignore how 
justice {law), witness testimony (narrative/literature), and memory (history) 
have been interrwined in transitional justice processes, most notably South 
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The second part of the chapter focuses on examples of scholarship that 
fostered mulridisciplinary practices. These texts might engage not only law, 
literature, and history, but also political theory, psychoanalytic theory, and 
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fominist theory. I look first at the significance of the Holocaust in the work 
of Richard H. Weisberg, a founder of the law and literature movement. 
I suggest that Weisberg' s insistence that law and literature address 
the Holocaust necessarily entails historicism. Weisberg's Failure of the 
Word (1984), Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (1996), and 
1999 essay reflecting on twenty years of law and literature bookend the 
other examples I discuss: Barbara Shapiro's "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" 
and ''Probabk Cause": Historical Perspectives on the AngW-American Law 
ofEvidence (199 1); Alexander Welsh's Strong Representatiom: Narrative 
and Circumstantial Evidence in England (1992); and Carole Pateman's 
The Sexual Contract (1988). Each historicizes Anglo-American law both 
synchronically and diachronically, tracing the evolution of epistemo­
logical, social, and polirical issues over the long arc from the early modern 
period co moderniry, attentive to particular historical conditions and 
drawing evidence from c.anonkal and non-canonical works. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of South Africa's Trurh and Reconciliation 
process, drawing on work by various scholars, including Pumla Godobo­
Madikizela, a member of the TRC. 
My discussion is confined to the English common law tradition, which 
is likely to be of greatest significance to readers of this volume. Neverthe­
less, as I will conclude, current uses oflaw, literature, and history urge us to 
be more international, as well as interdisciplinary. 
Disciplinary Barriers 
Literary and legal theorists have resisted historicism for reasons unique to 
their disciplines and approaches. It might seem obvious that a legal system 
based on precedents would be historically self-conscious. Instead, the very 
legitimacy of common law depended upon the fiction that each new legal 
decision reiterated the truth ofprior decisions, albeit in new circumstances. 
To admit that law evolved over many decisions and revisions of precedent 
would be to demystify the law's transcendent authority and locate legal 
power in judges. 
Historical jurisprudence first emerged as an influential force in Sir 
Henry Maine's Ancient Law (1861), and later in such works as James 
Fitzjames Stephen's History ofthe Criminal Law ofEngland (1 883) and The 
History ofEnglish Law Before the Time ofEdward I by Frederic William 
Maitland and Sir Frederick Pollock (1895). While we may think of 
historicism as a critical tool to expose entrenched power and denaturalize 
oppressive social relations, Victorian positivists, notably John Austin, 
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construed historical jurisprudence as reactionary, reasserting tradition 
against scientific effons at improving law. 
As A. V. Dicey put it in 190 5, "Historical research ... tends to quench 
the confident enthusiasm necessary for carrying out even the most well 
approved and the most beneficial among democratic innovations."' His­
toricism, then, was resisted by both traditional common law thinkers and 
positivist legal reformers. 
Nevertheless, in the decades preceding the law and literature movement, 
historians produced such magisterial works as William S. Holdsworth's 
thirteen-volume History of English Law (1903-66).' These may have 
become indispensable guides for current law :md literature scholarship, 
but they did nor necessarily intervene in legal thinking. And while legal 
theorists may have ignored law as history, historians devoted much atten­
tion to law and literature in history. For example, laws governing censor­
ship attracted the attention of social, political, and literary historians. 3 
Copyright law was also addressed as a matter of both legal and literary 
history. Well before postmodern theories of the author, Benjamin Kaplan, 
in An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967), mooted the idea that concep­
tions of authorship arose &om copyright law,4 But the domain of law 
and literature was drawn to exclude a host of robust scholarly relationships 
with history. 
Perhaps the most telling omission ofhistorical literary criticism &om the 
founding of the law and literature movement may be Ian Watt's Rise of 
the Novel (1957). 5 Among the preeminent works of literary criticism in the 
twentieth century, Watt's study argued that realist fiction succeeded in a 
' A. V. Dicey, LHtum on. tM RrlatiM betw«n Law and Pubik Opir,i(}n. ill England (London, 
Macmillan, 1962. [19051), P· 461. 
~e also Leon Radzinowicz, History ofEngli.<h Crimin11/ I aw and It, Adminimationfrom ,750, ;I vols. 
(London: Macmillan, 1948-196S): J. H. Baker, An fn.m,d,,cr£on to English Legal History (Londort: 
B~tterworth,, i971}; John Beanie, Crime and she (.bum in. Engl,md, 16(11)--I800 (Princeton: 
Princemn University Pre-s5. 1986). 
[n such studies » Charks Gillet's Burned Books: Neglected O,apurs ,'r, Briti,h Hl.5to,Y and l.i1muun, 
(New York: Columbia Vriiver.iity Prc.ss, 193l); F. S. Siebm's Frrrdom oftfu Pm, in England, 
1476-1776 (Urb.ana: UniveISity ofl!linois Press, 1952); Dortald ThomaisA L,mg Timr Burning: The 
History ~f Literary CemtJrship in. England (New York. Prn,:ger Pu!:>li,hers, 1969) and Leona 
Rostenberg's Thr Min,m"ty P,,,,s and the Engltsh Crown: A SruJy in &prm,on., I,<58---,625 
(Nieuwkoop: R De Graaf, 1971). 
ln Copyright in Hi>toriral Pmprcrive, Lyman Ray Patterson, a lawyer, produced what n::main.1 a 
ddiriitive and comprehensive ao:ount of how copyright shaped British literature from the Anr)o­
Saxon period to the nineteenth cemury. See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copynghr ,n lfororu:alPmpecttve 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt Urtiversiry P,ess, 196!,). 
Jan Wau, Thr Rise of the Novd Sn,di~ in. Defoe, Ricl•ardson and Fir/ding (Berkdey: Urtivmiry of 
California Press, 1917). 
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nevv literary marketplace by addressing readers as jurors, presenting them 
with evidence through plot and character, and asking them to render 
judgment based on the facts put before them. Though early advocates of 
the literary imagination in legal reasoning relied heavily on novels for their 
evidence, it was not Watt's historicized account of the genre that underlay 
their arguments. Historicism challenged claims for literature as the instan­
tiation of stable meanings and rranshistorical values. The significance of 
Rise of the Novel for law and literature would eventually be recognized in 
Welsh's Strong Representations. 
New Criticism, which banished historical scholarship from literary 
interpretation, wa.~ favored by early law and literature advocates. Rohen 
Weisberg and Guyora Binder locate New Criticism at the head of a line of 
practices, from reader-response through structuralism to hermeneutics, 
which connected law and literature via their formal fcatures. 6 New Criti­
cism endowed the aesthetic qualities of literary forms with ethical and 
philosophical significance. But it would not smvive challenges from post­
modernism and culnual criticism. 
New Historicism, which brought postmodern theories to the interpret­
ation of history, inspired literary critics to historicize law and literature 
topics. Michel Foucault's Madness and Civiliz,uion: A History ofInsanity 
in the Age ofReason (1964) and Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (1975) influenced scholarship on the legal persecution ofdeviance 
and provided rhr.: Panopticon as a compelling metaphor for the rise of a 
surveillance state. Early examples of New Historicist literary critics' 
engagemenr with legal themes include D. A. Miller's The Novel and the 
Police (1986), John B. Bender's Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and 
the Architecture of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century England (1987), and 
Marie~Christine Leps's Apprehending the Criminal' The Production of 
Deviance in Nineteenth~Century Discourses (1992). What is more, some 
traditional topics in the history of literature and law were revisited under 
the auspices of New Historicism. Citing global threats to freedom of 
speech in 1984, Annabel Patterson, in Censorship and interpretation: The 
Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England, revisited 
early modern censorship in terms of poststructuralist theories of the lyric.., 
Mark Rose, in Authors and Owners: The InventUm of Copyright (r993), 
6 Robert Weisberg and Guyora Binder (eds.}, Uurary <:rin'cism, of Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Pres,, 1000), pp. 11 5-15. 
7 Annabd Patterson, Cen,orship artd /r,trrpn:tmion: The Cmdmorn of 1)/riting and Readi.rtg m Early 
Modtm (Madi>on: University ofWiswn,iu Press, 1984). pp. 114··l\. 
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credited Roland Barthes and Foucault with having "stimulated" reconsid­
erations of the legal constructions of authorship.8 
Still, while New Historicism broughr literary critics into the field of law 
and literature, it often complicated exchanges with both historians and 
lawyers. New Historicism debunked literature as a repository of tran­
scendent values. Of what use could this version of literature be to legal 
thinkers who looked to literature to provide ethical meaning for legal 
decision-making? Conversely, New Historicist literary critics often failed 
to do justice to legal history. Viewing history through the lens ofFoucault 
or Lacan tended to n:veal the same pictures of power and repression, of 
disciplinary discourses and the "law of the father," regardless of historical 
period or nation. Historians influenced by postmodernism might connect 
with llrerary criticism attentive to the material conditions of literary 
production. How New Historicist literary critics represented legal history, 
however, could strain credulity. And those literary scholars who underM 
took to refine New Historicist accounts of legal history encountered 
considerable practical and methodological obstacles. Legal documents 
were not preserved and organized in such a way as to facilitate historical -
much less literary- research. Beyond rhe problem ofaccess, interpretation 
of legal documents required expertise in case law, trial procedures, and 
legal terminology. It would be some time before literary critics succeeded 
in bringing to historical legal documents the interpretive tools of literary 
analysis. 
Of course, these disciplinary negotiations were taking place in larger 
historical conrexts, which conjoined law, literature, and history. The HoloM 
caust raised devastating anxieties about representation - aesthetic, legal, and 
historical. Theodor Adorno's declaration in 195 I that "writing poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric" crystallized how literature and the aesthetic could 
not escape the traumatic history of injustice. The Nuremberg trials had 
presented an unprecedented spectacle oflegal procedure as some remedy for 
crimes against humanity. They also focused attention on the forensic 
probity of testimony and documentary evidence ofgenocide. Documentary 
records of these and other war crimes trials strained conventional historical 
explanations and invited psychoanalytic and anthropological interpretM 
ations. Hannah Arendc's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality 
ofEvil (1963) is likely the best-known and most controversial example of 
debates over the meaning of justice in war crimes trials. 
• Mark Rose, Authon and Ou7tm: Th, lr,vmtion rfCopyright (MassachU5cru: lfarvard Unh·en;ity 
Press, 1993), p. 1. 
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Holocaust testimony, it was determined, required new disciplinary col­
laborations, and projects commenced to collect videotaped interviews of 
survivors. These efforts could confer historical, psychological, and ethical 
meaning on testimony, operating not from traditional legal conceptions 
of evidence, but rather from literary and psychoanalytic principles. For 
example, the Video Archive of Holocaust Survivors' Testimonies at Yale 
(now the Fortunoff Video Archive) was founded in the early 1980s by 
Laurel Fox Vlock, Geoffrey H. Hanman, and Dori Laub, MD. Fox Vlock 
was a documentary film maker and reporter. Harunan was a leading expo­
nent ofdeconstruction and influential critic ofRomantic poetry and Laub is 
a psychiatrist. This multidisciplinary endeavor would preserve a historical 
record of Holocaust survivors, informed by an understanding of testimony 
that differed fundamentally from its status in legal contexts. In Testimony: 
Criser of Wimessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History, Laub and 
his coauthor, the literary theorist Shoshana Felman, describe the listeners 
(interviewers of survivors) in these terms: "They have to learn ... how to 
bond with the narrator in a common struggle to release the testimony 
which, in spite of inhibitions on both sides, will allow the telling of the 
trauma to proceed and to reach its testimonial resolurion. "9 This archive, 
along with other Holocaust archives around the world, established a para­
digm for documenting genocide through first-person narratives. The arch­
ives also had a profound effect on how history should be done. 
This is evident in the "Historians' Debate" of r986-9 in Germany. The 
prospect of Gennany's integration into the West after reunification posed 
the question: How would Germany's national identity continue to be 
defined by the Holocaust? As Dominick la Capra notes, the debate raised 
two broader questions: "whether one could neatly separate between arenas 
or spheres in modern life (the professional and the public spheres, for 
example) and whether one could define history in purely professional, 
objective, third-person terms under the aegis of a structurally differentiated 
or even autonomized paradigm of research."'° The historian Ernst Nolte 
assened that Germany should no longer be identified with Hitler's "Final 
Solution"; significantly, the leading rebuttal came from the political phil­
osopher JG.rgen Habermas. rr 
9 Shoshana Felman and Dory W!ub (ed.!;,), Tmimony: Crim of Wirnesri"g in Literature, Aychoan,ifyris 
and Hirrono (London: Taylor and Francis, 1991), p . .<Vii. 
'
0 Dominick WI Capra. Hisrory and Mmwry a.fur At1rchwitz. (fthaca, Cornell Univer5ity Pre~, 1998). 
p, 67. 
" For a discussion of the "Hisroriaru' Deb~te" in Holoo,ust stud1e,, iee Li Capr.1, Hist11ry and 
Mnnory, pp. 49-68. 
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Habermas, Adorno, and Arendt were among the philosophers and 
political theorists who called on historians to transform their methodologies 
to address the Holocaust and historical trauma. La Capra, Hartman, and 
Felman were among the literary critics who cxened similar pressure. The 
common theme was that not only understanding, but also justice, required 
more capacious and multidisciplinary methods of interpretation. Their 
claims had implications for !aw, as well. Richard Weisberg's influential 
contributions to our interdiscipline reveal how the leg:icy of the Holocaust 
engaged law and literature with hiSTory, in a manner distinct from New 
Historicism. 
Lest Law and Literature Forgeu Richard H. Weisberg and History 
In his groundbreaking books The Failure ofthe Word: The Protagonist as 
Lawyer in Modern Fiction (1984) and Poethics: And Other Strategies of 
Law and Literature (r996), Weisberg had objected to postmodern theor~ 
ies for their axiomatic indeterminism. Frequently he turned to Holocaust 
history to demonstrate that not merely theory but also justice was at 
stake. For example, citing Stanley Fish's Is There a Text in This C'4ss?, 
Weisberg writes chat "[Fish's] powerful endorsement of the view that 
professional norms cannot exist apart from the practices of the commu­
nity allegedly bound by those norms must eventually run up against 
holocaustic barriers.""· For Weisberg, 
rhe lesson of Vichy [France] is that professional commumnes cannot 
accept theories denying che objective existence of texrs. They must resist 
such theories, yet fight to understand whar is mt'ant by textuality as 
something apart from any reader or group of readers, and then substantively 
learn to evaluate the motivt's and subjective biases from which all texts 
are generated ... [Vichy lawyers'] zeal in interpreting [Nazi) legislation, 
unconstrained by traditional (textual) French notiom of egalitarianism and 
personal freedom, exemplifies the risks ro professional communities of 
theories privileging situation over standards.' J 
Weisberg declared in Vichy l,aw and the Holocaust in France (1996) that 
"Selective forgetfulness has no place in the post-Holocaust world."14 
Drawing upon archives of historical legal documents, historical scholar­
ship, and postmodern theories, Weisberg aimed to debunk the prevailing 
" R,char<l H. Weisberg, V,dry !.a.w t1nd the Holormm m Frtzna (London and Nev, York: Routledge, 
1996), p. 17). 
'• Weiskrg, VidQ' Law, p. 17 5. 14 Weisberg, Vichy Lau,, p. 3. 
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myth that all French were part of the resistance. And he brought to bear 
the very aims for legal education that he had been espousing through the 
law and literature movement. In speculating on why the French legal 
profession collaborated in Nazi terror, he notes habits shared by lawyers 
of rhe United Stares, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, viz., "an 
ingrained approach to the reading oflegal texts" (original italics] that enabled 
a select group of "others" to be excluded from legal protection. "Unless 
legal education changes ~ in part because it has learned from these events ··· 
liberal constitutional cultures must turn to the other side of the coin, and 
they must constantly insist on less flexible readings of the legal system's 
egalitarian stories."' 1 Weisberg thereby added a historical perspective to 
the requirements for a legal education that contributes to justice. 
In "Literature's Twenty-Year Crossing into the Domain of Law: Con­
tinuing Trespass or Right by Adverse Possession?" Weisberg defended his 
approach ro law and literature in hisroricist terms. His rebuttal of post­
modernist anti-foundationalism concluded, 
postmodernists have only grudgingly perceived that post-war strategies of 
language have perhaps been wrongly geared as a response to the referential 
and idealist "simplicity" of Hitler's rhetoric, geared in fact to avoid at all 
oosrs all referential language, all clarity ofspeech, all quests for meaning and 
even law. Now, with new work revealing that the Holocaust emerged at 
least as much from complex, creative and even deconstmctive strategies of 
oppressive speech ... law and literature has eschewed any unambiguous 
alliance with an antifoundational program. '6 
Putting his project of law and literature into a historical context, Weisberg 
asserts, "The events of this tragic century have more than fulfilled the 
prophetic signs emerging from Melville, Dostoevsky, and Ka.fka - that the 
West was ready for a cataclysm, and that the innocent of rhe world would 
suffer horribly during the death throes of the dominant culture."' 7 This 
is one form of historicist thinking - looking at literature of the past for 
explanations of the present and ethical principles for law's furute. "Our 
goal, so far unreached," Weisberg concludes, "is justice." 
Weisberg represents a major line of thought about history in rhe field of 
law and literature. Significantly, though they share ethical concerns, this 
strand stand~ apart theoretically from LaCapra's and Fdman's approaches 
" Wei.sberg, Vichy Law, p. 4. 
'~ Richard H. Weisberg, "Literature'> 1wemy-year crossing into the domain of law: co1uinlling 1re,;p1ss 
or right by adverse possession?" in Michael Frct:man and Andrew Lewis (eds.). Cum:m Legal lrsues: 
Uterature and Law (Oxfutd: Oxford Univcr>ity Pres,, 1999), vol. i, pp. ) )··)6. 
'
7 Weisberg, "Literature's rwenry-year cro,sing," p. 60. 
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to historical trauma. Weisberg may share more with Habermas, who 
similarly reads the past to discern new social formations for attaining justice 
in the present. Trauma studies may share methodologies with New His­
toricism, but the latter neither confines itself to examples of historical 
trauma nor brings the same ethical commitments to its subject matter. 
New Historicists may take up law and literature topics with skepticism 
about power and the disciplining effects ofdiscourses, but often their work 
makes no presentist claims about history. Increasingly, they draw upon 
the materials of traditional empiricist historical scholarship of law and 
literature. Al:, I suggested at the outset, then, a host ofethical and methodo­
logical commitments have arisen since the founding of the law and litera­
ture movement that have brought historians, legal scholars, literary critics, 
and others into conversation to practice multidisciplinary methods of 
interpretation. Significantly, multidisciplinary scholarship, such as that 
of Shapiro, Welsh, and Pateman, contributes a more robust defense of 
Weisberg' s aims for law and literature. 
A History ofTruth across the Disciplines: Barbara Shapiro's 
"Beyond Reasonable Douht" and "Probabk Cause'~· Historical 
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law ofEvidence 
Barbara Shapiro's multidisciplinary explorations of the history of truth 
in the early modern period represent a key development for historical 
approaches to literature and law. In Probability and Certainty in 
Seventeenth-Century England: A Study ofthe Relationships between Natural 
Science, Religion, History, law, and literature (1983) she demonstrated 
that law did not constitute an autonomous institution and body of 
doctrine, but functioned dynamically within a network of discourses in 
evolving ideas of truth and belief. How legal doctrine and criminal 
procedure could reveal the workings of that dynamic was the subject of 
"Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause':, Historical Perspectives 
on the Anglo-American Law ofEvidence (1991}. 
Nothing is more fundamental to legal decision-making than the inter­
connection betWeen epistemology and justice, or, more baldly, the true and 
the good Investigating this relationship as discursively constructed and 
historically contingent required a reconceptualization of legal decision­
making and methodological innovation. To demonstrate how law interacted 
with - and shaped - the transfonnation of dominant ideas of what was 
probaMy true, Shapiro translated across disciplines, examining texts from 
law, religion, and philosophy from 1500 to 1800. That is, she proceeded 
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syn chronically and diachroniw.lly. Though Shapiro covers an extensive 
span of time - actually reaching back to the Middle Ages and suggesting 
implications for contemporary law- she resists applying a master narrative. 
She reads with attention to differences among discourses at particular 
points in history as well as how they change across time. 
Moreover, Shapiro draws attention to the problems posed by legal 
history. "Law is a particularly challenging branch of intellectual history," 
she reflects, "because, at least in the common-law world, the actors being 
observed have a panicular interest in disguising what the historian seeks 
to discover."' 8 The proccsse.~ of legal decision-making, she notes, are 
largely unrecorded. "What we can know about the history of this aspect 
of the law ofevidence is very limited because of the black box of the jury, 
and of the magistrate, for rhat matter ... Almost no historical or even 
contemporary record exists of what actually goes on in the minds of the 
actors in the criminal justice system." What judges do say "typically 
reduces itself to such talismanic formulas as 'beyond reasonable doubt' 
and 'probable cause.""'! 
lo the absence of direct evidence, then, she models how a multidisci­
plinary approach reveals "the way in which religious and philosophical 
notions concerning the nature of truth and the appropriate methods of 
attaining it affect legal concepts of evidence and proof."'"° From dense and 
often undigested guides to magistrates and jurors, among other sources, 
Shapiro identifies de\·eloping pressures on conceptions of jury trials and 
jurors' duties, leading to the juror becoming an evaluator of fact. This new 
function demanded reliable epistemological guidelines and Shapiro argue~ 
that, while legal doctrine was influenced by standards of proof in other 
disciplines, legal conceptions of probability and certainty exened a major 
influence beyond law. 
Formalism Has a History: Alexander Welsh's 
Strong Representations (I99:2,) 
Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England 
historicized formalist analysis in the imerdiscipline of law and literature. 
Welsh had addressed Victorian law and literature in George Eliot 
and Blackmail (1985) and From Copyright to Copperfield: The Identity 
'' B.ubara Shapiro. "Rryond Rf4!0tiabk Dm,bt" and Tnrhab/r Cau.s(": Hiuerfral Pmpf,Tluer on thr 
AngW-Amnican Law ofEvidn,a (Berkeley: Uni,er.sii_y of California Press, 1991 ), p. 249. 
'" Shapiro, "Beyond rcawnable doubt," p. xii. '" Shapiro, "Beyond reasonabl~ doub,." p. ,.;;, 
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of Dickens (1987). His inAuential 1990 article, "Burke and Bentham on 
the Narrative Potential of Circumstantial Evidence," marked a move into 
the study of probability and its representational forms. 21 Strong Represen­
tations would take up where Shapiro's Beyond Reasonable Doubt left off. 
Welsh focused on the period 1700-1900, but like Shapiro, he saw the 
need for new, multidisciplinary investigation into the long arc ofepistemo­
logical and ethical transformations from the early modern period into 
modernity. And, like Shapiro, Welsh considered law to be a key force in 
this dynamic - not an autonomous category of discourse and practice, but 
one jostling alongside not only literature but theology and science, as well. 
"The history of narratives founded on circumstantial evidence is multifari­
ous," Welsh wrote, "and neither lawyers nor novelists nor psychologists 
wouJd have pushed the evidence so far, or forged so many chains, were ir 
not for important precedents in science and natural religion."n 
The principal differences betvveen Welsh and Shapiro are suggested 
by his title. For Welsh, evidence and belief arise from multidisciplinary 
dynamics, but they are constituted through "representations." He inves­
tigates the formal narrative qualities of probative circumstantial evidence 
across disciplines - how they are murually constitutive and how they 
evolve over time. For the period he studies, he takes "strong representa­
tions" to mean those that 
[O]penly distrust direct tesrimony, insist on submining witnesses ro the test 
of corroborating circumstances, and claim to know many things without 
anyone's having sem them at all. They may be religious or legal or literary 
representations, a. long as no devilish or miraculous interventions are 
admitted. They are very much of the Enlightenment, representations that 
mirror without my~tery the Pauline evidence of things not seen.'J 
"To make a representation," he explains, "means to subordinate the 
facts to a conclusion that makes a difference one way or the other. "24 That 
is, representations of evidence employ narrative devices of selection, 
emphasis, order, point of view, etc., as a rhetorical strategy regardless of 
discipline or genre. Interestingly, he locates the origins of this insight 
connecting literary narrative strategies with the management of legal 
evidence in Ian Watt's The Rise ofthe Novel. "Watt's implicit comparison 
" Alexander Welsh. "Burke and Bentham on the narrative pmential of circumstantial evidence," Ntw 
Litrrary History."' (1989-90), 607->7. 
" AlelUlmler W~lsh, Sming Rrpmemari,ms: Narratiue m,J Cirromstlmtial £.,,d,'tlce in fngland 
{Balcimore, Johns Hopkins Uni~ersny Press, 1992). p. 7. 
" Welsh, Strong Rtpmmtatioru, p. 8. "' Webh, Strong Rtpmmrarioru, p. <). 
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between Defoe's or Richardson's realism and Fielding's," Welsh writes, 
"applies equaUy well to distinctions between direct and indirect evidence, 
ot between evidentiary facts and facts arranged, in Burke's terms, 'narra­
tively and historically.' In a given trial, each kind of evidence may have its 
virtues, as the nature of the case of personality of the witnesses will 
determine. The same is true of the noveL" 2 ' 
Welsh brings to his subject a literary historian's appreciation for the 
conditions of authorship and publication, as well. The explosion of print 
culture, in Welsh's argument, exerts its own influence on how evidence is 
evaluated and managed. He attributes the evolution of modern "adjectival 
law" to treatises on rules of evidence and published law repons, which 
burgeoned in the late eighteenth century. Such authoritative tomes as 
Wtgmore on Evidence should be understood in part as ways of managing 
proliferating "legal" publications, such as trial accounts (including the Old 
Bailey Sessions Papers), sensational pamphlets, and legal digests. 
Finally, Welsh read~ a range ofliterary genres (fiction, poetry, criticism), 
as well as extensive professional and popular legal, theological, and scien­
tific materials. This includes a historicized example of law as literature: 
a chapter on the epistemological import, historical contexts, and rhetorical 
devices of James Fitzjames Stephen's introduction to EVidence (1872). 
Stephen, "whose authority in English criminal law" Welsh describes as 
being "as great as Fielding's in the novel," treat~ circumstantial evidence 
almost exdu~ively in murder cases, thereby betraying an anxiety about 
religious attitudes toward human life in the age of Lyell's geology, some­
thing he shares in common with Tennyson's in Memoriam. 26 Lyell, Welsh 
notes, was also a barrister. In sum, Strong Representations set a high bar for 
the multidisciplinary study of the history of evidence. 
Telling a Difference Story: Carole Pateman's The Sexual 
ConlTact (1988) 
The Sexual Contract is a leading example of how theories of difference 
were historicized - a critical element in historicizing law and literature. 
Difference as the principle by which inequities and subjugation are consti+ 
tu.red was, of course, a central concern of much law and literature scholar­
ship. Feminists and critical race theorists, for example, found in law and 
literature an opportunity to combat present-day legal oppression with 
literary liberation - at the same time critiquing the interdiscipline fut its 
'' Wd,h. Strong Representllliom, p. 6). '" Wdsh, Strong RepmenUJtiom. pp. I jl; 114-5. 
70 CHRISTINE L. KRUEGER 
resistance to difference. And though it would seem to have been an 
obvious point ofengagement among law and literature practitioners from 
various disciplines, questions of difference were - and to some degree 
remain - confined within disciplinary and theoretical silos. Ahistorical 
conceptions of law, literature, and difference, though not the sole causes 
of these disconnects, were major contribucors. Treating difference not as 
an ahistorical absolute but as a historically constructed system of social 
organization in significant ways enabled - perhaps demanded - multi­
disciplinary approaches. Significantly, one such breakthrough argument 
came from a political theorist. Carole Pateman approached law not as an 
autonomous institution or a cranshistorical metaphor, but as one entity 
in a network of evolving social practices wirh unjust, ongoing, and 
remediable consequences. 
Paceman historicized difference as a mechanism of political subordin­
ation with a sweeping, detailed, and vigorously argued history of social 
contract theory, demonstrating how it necessarily entailed sexual inequality. 
Drawing on feminist historians such as Gerda Lerner, Paceman demon~ 
strated that patriarchy was neither a relic from long-gone kinship structures 
nor an abstraction of postmodern feminist theory; rather, it was an identi­
fiable aspect of the writings of Locke, Rousseau, and other social contract 
theorists. From its origins in the seventeenth century, social contract theory 
depended upon an unacknowledged sexual contract - the marriage 
contract - with the result that women's inferior legal status became a 
constitutive feature of liberal democracy. 
By demonstrating that gender subordination was inherent in the 
transition from status to contract, Paceman made a radical challenge to 
received histories of modern political structures since Maine's inffuentiaJ 
Ancient Law. Moreover, she argued that our failure to recognize how 
social contract theory historically obscured its dependence on the sexual 
conrract prevented us from understanding how women were necessarily 
disadvantaged in conremporary liberal democracy. If"patriarchy" was no 
longer a historical dinosaur, relegated to the era of kinship politics, but 
was instead a vital part of an ongoing historical legacy, then its function 
in conremporary social and political relationships demanded attention. 
Paceman extends her own argument to the social and legal status of 
contemporary sex workers and surrogate morhers. 
Pateman's argument may have gone to the heart oflega! history, but 
it met resistance. Nor did law and literature respond immediately to 
feminist challenges. But in time, the history of difference - gender, race, 
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sexuality - became a major focus of law and literature. Two years after 
The Sexual Contract wa.~ published, literary critic Carolyn Heilbrun and 
law professor Judith Resnik drew attention to the persistent resistance to 
feminism in the law and literature movement. '-7 They argued that law 
and literature remained "indifferent to the rich infusion of feminist 
theory in literature departments and to the claims that feminist jurispru­
dence was making in law." 28 Their work sparked defensive responses, 
but also encouraged feminist scholars to address the history of women 
through literature and law. They were joined by critical race theorists 
similarly objecting to claims that law could be equitably administered if it 
failed to address racial difference. Many theories contributed to the press 
for a recognition of difference in law, and they often came from literary 
theory and appealed to literary texts as a corrective to the historical 
legacies of legal oppression. 29 
Pateman, Shapiro, Welsh, and Weisberg help us to recognize how lines 
of inquiry and methods of analysis integrated historical thinking into law 
and literature. For us, such key concepts as evidence, testimony, agency, 
and equity all have histories constructed across multiple disciplines. 'What 
requires our attention now is how our practices have fostered new legal and 
political proce.~se.~ that institutionalize historical narration as a response to 
atrocity and as a means to transition to just, democratic political structures 
from oppressive, violent, even genocidal, regimes. It may be hard to see 
what impact historicizing law and literature might have beyond the acad­
emy. But the theoretical underpinnings of our multidiscipline are largely 
those to which advocates of truth and reconciliation processes appeal. That 
law, literature, and history would become intertwined in transitional 
justice processes during the same period in which the interdiscipline of 
law and literature was coming to embrace historical approaches is no mere 
coincidence. If we engage in historical approaches to law and literature, 
then we should be aware ofhow the theories we employ are shaping justice 
in the present and future . 
., Carnlyr1 Hedhrun and Judith Resnik, "Convergences: law, lncr.itllre and fr:min11m," Yak I.aw 
journal, 9'! (1990), 1913. 
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Witnessing History/ Achieving Justice 
Law and literature's engagement with history - and a web of other 
disciplines - has had profound practical consequences for how we have 
come to respond to atrocities since the Holocaust. As we have seen, the 
Holocaust radically challenged assumptions about justice, representation, 
aesthetics, and history. The urgent demands for justice and reconciliation 
posed by new acts of mass violence tax our abilicy to mount meaningful 
responses. Martha Minow has described contemporary responses to atro­
cities as: 
lurch[ingJ among the rhetorics of law (puriishment, compensation, deter­
rence): history (truth); cheoiogy (forgiveness); therapy (healing); art 
(commemoration and disturbance); and education (learning lessons). None 
is adequate and yet, by invoking any of these rhetorio, people wager that 
social responses can alter the emotional experiences of individuals and 
societies living after mass violence. 30 
Minow makes these remarks as editor of Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: 
Memory, Law and Repair, a collection of essays bringing together scholars 
from many fields with the hope that their shared insights might yield new 
pracrices that disrupt the narrative of violence, rrauma, and revenge. 
M inow herself exemplifies this phenomenon. A leading legal theorist, she 
has been involved in many human rights projects, including the Independ­
ent International Commission on Kosovo and the UN High Commission 
on Refugees. Significantly, her thinking on post-atrocity justice and 
healing has been shaped by literary and philosophical theories of hisrory. 
Responding to her own question - "After mass atrocity, what can and 
should be faced about the pase" - she cites conflicting answers from Je-.m 
Baudrillard, Milan Kundera, the philosopher Hermann Lubbe, and the 
journalist Tina Rosenberg, among others. How histories of violence are 
narrated conditions the likelihood of justice and peace in the future. 
"Living after genocide, ma~s atrocity, totalitarian terror," Minow writes, 
"makes remembering and forgetting not just about dealing with the past. 
The treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting crucially 
shape1. the present and the future of individuals and entire socicties."3 ' 
'
0 Martha Minow, Breaking the Cyd.-s of Hatred· Memory. Law and Repair (Princeton: Princeron 
Univmity Press. ioo:i.), p. i7. 
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In other words, these traumatic events necessarily conjoin law, lirerature, 
and hisrory with real urgency. 
Julie Stone Peters, a skeptic oflaw and literature, cites the interdiscipline 
as one key source of the testimonial practices that have been institutional­
i1ed in transitional justice movements. "What lies behind claims about the 
value of post-atrocity narrative," she argue,, 
arc a set of views influenced by ancient Christian traditions of conf-<:ssion 
and redemption and by modern psychoanalysi~, but horrowed al.so from 
literary and narrative theory of the pa,t quarter century. These views were 
promulgated most directly by what became known in the r98os as the "law 
and literature movement," with its r99os offshoot, the "legal storytelling 
movement" ... These movements entered into dialogue with less narrowly 
legal and more global .\\lb-disciplines and theoretical movemems: Holocaust 
studie.1, with its discus~ion of the nature and limiL~ of the represemation of 
atrocity and the paradoxes of memorial; feminist cridcism and critical race 
theory, with their discussion of the libcratory force of counter-hegemonic 
narrative; Latin American "restimonio" and uauma studies, with their 
discussion of witness bearing and the curative power of truth. 32 
But even for this critic of law and literature in the domain of post­
atrocity politics, more history - not less - is the answer. Having proffered 
this genealogy of "truth commissions and other testimonial venues," 
Peters urges us to "look at the intertwined hi~tories of modern literature 
and modern rights, histories that are ... inextricably linked from the 
eighteenth century onward. Understanding these linked histories may 
help us not only to contextualize contemporary claims about the func­
tion of narrative in the representation of human rights abuses, but also to 
look cridcally at some of their strongest assumptions." 33 
South Africa'~ Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is the best­
known example of how this process has led to what Claire Moon has 
termed the "reconciliation industry." 14 Mark Sanders's analysis of the 
report of South Africa's TRC succinctly illustrates how law, personal 
narratives, and hi~tory are linked. Whereas the Commission solicited, 
attended to, and recorded testimony from both victims and perpetrators 
of apartheid, in ih five-volume written report "extracts from testimony arc 
'' Julie Swne Peter.,, "l.Hera1ure,' the ''eights of man,"' and narrallves of atrocity: hisror:cal 
background, to the culture of rc,tCmon~·.'· Yale Journal of I.au, and rhe Humanitir.,, 17(2) (2003), 
l\\-6. 
" Pe,er:s, "Literatme," 254, >JG 
'' Claire Moon, l'<larra1we Political Recrmcd,arion: South Africa's I ruth and Reconciliation Commission 
(Maryland and London: Lexington !looks, 2008), pp. i \ 
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illustrative, first~person attestations to the veracity of the historical narra­
tive, written in the third person, that encloses them." Sanders reminds us 
that the report explicitly states that its purpose is not "to wrire the history 
of th[e] country." Nevertheless, he argues that "the cumulative effect is of 
a thorough historical reckoning, albeit one driven by an exposure and 
cataloguing of human rights violations so relentless that it leaves little space 
for anything other than a history of gross human right<. violations." 31 
The TRC brings home to m the real-life impact ofour scholarly theories 
and practices. This is made particularly vivid in the writing of Pumla 
Godobo--Madikizela. A theorist of transitional justice movements, she 
brings a complex rnuhidisciplinary perspective to rhe matrix of identities 
she inhabits as a black South African woman, a professor of psychology, 
and a member of rhe TRC. In A Human Being Died that Night: A South 
African Story ofForgiveness {2003), Godobo-Madik.izela reAects on her own 
subject positions and their competing responses to history. As a member of 
the TRC, she writes, 
My emotiom were becoming increasingly confused, but only in the sense 
that they represented my multiple identities, the past, and the present: as a 
d1ild, student and adulc growing up under the apartheid regime; as a human 
being ab[e to feel compassion for the suffering of ochers; a.~ a member of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commis.sion expected to remain levelheaded in my 
thinking abom the past. 36 
Both national and personal healing demand a robust theory of forgiveness, 
Godobo-Madikizela argues - a narrative that negotiates the ferociously 
difficult demands of historical trauma and future peace. 
First, Godobo-Mad.ikizela acknowledges that the TRC was "essentially a 
political project, the creation of a political compromise that played out in 
the public domain." There are limits to whar the legal, political, and 
narrative structures of the TRC could contribute to transitional justice, 
bypassing the real social and psychological work of processing historical 
rrauma. Godobo-Madikizela presents two options for dealing with histor­
ical trauma, both taken &om Holocaust theorists - respectively, Hannah 
Arendt and Emanuel Levinas. She rejects Arendt's argument that the 
Holocaust transcends human ethics and politics and therefore lies outside 
'' Mark Sanders. Ambiguities of Wimming; Law and Lit.mtture in the Timt: ofa Truth CommfrsWn 
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the domains of forgiveness or justice, remarking that "One of the 
problems with these views, which have come to represent conventional 
wisdom on the subject of forgiveness in some circles, is that they are no 
longer realistic in light of actual practice in post-conflict situations."l 7 
Instead, Godobo-Madikizela seeks to break the cycle of violence and 
turns to Levinas, as well as Julia Krisreva and Jacques Derrida, to theorize 
"restorative justice" and reconciliation. She poses the question: "is Levi­
nas's ethics compatible with the political realm?"18 Her answer begins 
with literature, specifically Julia Kristeva's analysis of Crime and Punish­
ment, in which Kristeva counters "Arendt's conceptualization of the 
term [forgiveness], [and] contends that forgiveness is a means to initiate 
a new beginning."'9 Next she turns to Derrida's reflection.~ on history 
and forgiveness. Derrida, she writes, "expands the boundaries of the 
forgivable beyond Hannah Arendt's ethical limits, revealing its complex­
ity. Placing it in an historical context he resists giving the absolute 'final 
word' on what can or cannot be forgiven. "40 
What does this tell us about the state of law, literature, and history 
as a multidiscipline? First, it tells us that these three disciplines - and 
their practitioners - have been inextricably connected in current events. 
What was once a matter of overcoming academic silos, or methodological 
disputes, is now a practical reality with wide impact. Julie Stone Peters 
once opined that literary scholars were drawn to legal topics to compen­
sate for their irrelevance in human affairs. As her own more recent work 
indicates, history has thrust literature into politics with a vengeance. 
Second, our practice takes place in a context that is not only more 
interdisciplinary, but also international. My focus here has been on the 
English common law tradition, which partly encompasses South Africa. 
Bur our multidisciplim: will increasingly be compelled to be comparative 
and rake into account distinctive rradirions of law, literature, and history. 
Finally, that our most urgent agenda should be to historicize law and 
literature more fully, whatever our area of research. fu I have argued 
elsewhere, such scholarship "demonstrates the historically contingent 
political impact of legal and literary texts for outsider advocacy." 
Historical approaches to law and literarure, regardless of the particular 
subject matter, caution against claims that any discourse possesses reli­
ably salutary qualities. What is demonstrated by the scholarship I have 
di~cussed here is that we live with the legacy of modernity, "inherited 
" G"doho-\-ladiki,da, A Hum.m, p. 4;,. '' Godobo-.\fad.ikizela. A Human, p. 19· 
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conceptions of justice [that] have been imagined across a variety of 
discourses, literature and law each making distinctive contributions and 
offering salutary mutual critiques."4 ' 
Finally, historical approaches to law and literature should nor merely 
dissolve differences among disciplinary methodologies, Rather, they should 
challenge us to become more deeply literate in an array of discinctive 
disciplines - law, literature, history, theology, philosophy, psychology, 
politics, economics, science - so that each enhances our critical under­
standing of the others. As practices of teaching and scholarship, historical 
approaches to law and literature contribute an informed, sympathetic 
critique to projecrs that wisely engage the full range of human discourses 
to advance the common good. 
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